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Abstract 
Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan,  and  Kazakhstan  have  adopted  significant  legislative 
changes since the fall of the former Soviet Union in an effort to attract foreign 
direct investment into their energy sectors. Of the three republics, Kazakhstan has 
been the most successful in attracting foreign interest, but all three republics face 
significant challenges in further development of oil and gas infrastructure. Even if 
these  countries  are  completely  successful  in  bringing  in  foreign  investment,  a 
question will remain: who wins and who loses in these countries. Using updated 
data, this paper will use a computable general equilibrium model to measure the 
effects of FDI into Central Asia. Results of the model suggest that the region would 
be better off overall from foreign investment in its natural gas sector, due mostly to 
improvements  in  overall  production  efficiency  and  its  overall  terms  of  trade. 
However,  the  gain  in  the  natural  gas  sector  would  come  at  the  expense  of 
production and net exports of non-petroleum related industries. 
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Introduction 
Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  have  abundant  oil  and  natural  gas  reserves. 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, a lack of sufficient foreign investment, 
geographical  challenges,  inadequate  export  pipeline  infrastructure,  and  political 
instability  have  been  deterrents  of  both  countries  becoming  major  energy 
exporters (Energy Information Agency, 2009). While both countries hope recent 
agreements  with  international  companies  and  countries  may  help  them  find 
alternative  export  routes  outside  of  Russia  and  leverage  their  hydrocarbon 
competitiveness  in  the  region,  energy  production  from  Turkmenistan  and 
Uzbekistan has declined since 2004. The primary factor has been a lack of new 
investment and technical capacity to bring new oilfields online.  
Kazakhstan is more of a success story in terms of foreign investment. According to 
the EIA, after years of foreign investment into the country's oil and natural gas 
sectors,  the  landlocked  Central  Asian  state  has  recently  begun  to  realize  its 
enormous production potential. With sufficient export options, Kazakhstan could 
become a major world energy producer and exporter over the next decade. Still 
however, the nation is in great need of investment. Its lack of available gas export 
infrastructure will limit export growth.  
This paper will summarize the investment climate for oil and gas investment in 
Central Asia, and then use a CGE model to measure the potential effects of such 
investment. Part I will provide a brief summary of the energy policies of each of 
these three former Soviet republics. In each of them, the focus of the government’s 
seems (though often unsuccessfully) to create a more attractive investment climate 
for western oil and gas investors. Part II of the paper will be a general equilibrium 
model that will examine the effects of these desired investment flows if they ever 
do materialize in the future. 
1. Energy Policies of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan 
1.1. Turkmenistan Background 
Turkmenistan also has a lot of oil and gas. Its proven hydrocarbon reserves run 
from  offshore  Caspian  fields  to  the  Darya  Basin  reserves  bordering  Uzbekistan. 
There are companies from all over the world investing in Turkmenistan, but several 
issues  remain  a  major  obstacle  to  others.  American  and  other  major  western 
companies seem to be most nervous about Turkmen projects to date for political 
and geographic reasons. Iran is a possibility for exports, but Iran is still under U.S. 
sanctions. Despite a new U.S. president and somewhat friendlier-sounding rhetoric, 
the Iran option remains complicated at best. Both ExxonMobile and Shell have 
either stopped or suspended their operations in Turkmenistan, citing small field Foreign Direct Investments in Central Asian Energy: A CGE Model 
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sizes,  poor  results,  or  worries  about  pipeline  development.  Presently,  it  is  the 
Russians who appear to be the most promising option for Turkmenistan. 
The Caspian Sea itself is a source of investor uncertainty. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
and Russia have basically agreed upon their Caspian Sea borders through various 
treaties, but the Caspian boundaries are still unsettled, much in part because Iran 
continues  to  demand  a  minimum  one-fifth  share  of  the  seabed  to  itself. 
Turkmenistan has balked at the Iranian position, and hasn’t signed on with the 
other three former Soviet states because of it. 
With uncertainty over geographic rights and Iran’s position, energy firms have been 
slow  to  sign  PSA  and  other  such  agreements.  Such  potential  investors  have 
included Russia’s Rosneft, Itera, and Zarubezhneft; and Wintershall of Germany. 
Foreign investment in Turkmenistan outside of the Caspian region has been more 
robust, including projects by Maersk, Petronas, and Dragon. There is  still  some 
dispute over the boundary between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, but it appears 
not to be as much of an obstacle to investors as the Caspian issues. 
Beyond  the  economic  and  legal  framework  of  investing  in  Turkmenistan  (and 
elsewhere in the region), the political systems are another important factor for 
investors. Turkmenistan has an extremely strong centralized authority. This article 
examines  the  legal  regime  applicable  to  foreign  investments  in  Turkmenistan’s 
upstream oil and gas sector. These types of investments are significantly influenced 
in Turkmenistan, as in the other ex-Soviet countries, by the starting-point rule that 
all underground natural resources – including oil and gas – are in exclusive state 
ownership. 
Despite its authoritarian rule, Turkmenistan has taken significant steps in attempt 
to clarify investment law for foreigners. In 2000, Turkmenistan adopted detailed 
administrative  rules  for  conducting  oil  operations.  Before  these  rules  were 
introduced,  operating  companies  could  easily  have  found  themselves  violating 
obscure Soviet laws dating back to 1970 or earlier. The new rules fill out many 
details not covered in Turkmenistan’s general Subsurface Law of 1992 (Republic of 
Turkmenistan,  1992),  and  the  more  specific  Petroleum  Law  of  1996  (the 
"Petroleum Law" or "PL") (Republic of Turkmenistan, 1996). 
1.2. Turkmenistan Legal Framework 
Article 15 of Turkmenistan’s Petroleum Law says that natural resources found in 
the  subsurface  may  be  developed  only  on  the  basis  of  a  license,  and  that  the 
licensee has the right to conduct only those operations specified in the license. 
There is either a tender, or direct negotiations, prior to the issuance of a petroleum 
license and the conclusion of a petroleum operations contract. 
Licensees  may  be:  (i)  Turkmenistan  legal  entities  (irrespective  of  the  form  of 
ownership) or nationals; or (ii) in accordance with Article 14 of the Petroleum Law, Michael P. BARRY  
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foreign  legal  entities,  provided  that  they  register  in  Turkmenistan  a  branch  or 
participate in a joint venture. Somewhat tighter requirements for foreign entity 
licensees are found in the 1998 License Issuance Decree (Republic of Turkmenistan, 
1998), however, these conflict with the Petroleum Law, and it appears that the 
more liberal statutory provisions prevail.  
Article  8  establishes  the  following  types  of  petroleum  licenses:  license  for 
exploration; license for production; and combination license for exploration and 
production. PL Article 19 allows issuance of an exploration license for up to six 
years plus two two-year extensions; a production license for up to 20 years plus a 
possible  single  five-year  extension;  and  combined  exploration  and  production 
license  for  the  maximum  combined  exploration  and  production  terms  (plus 
extensions) together. The Petroleum Law now specifically states – at Articles 16 
and  19  -  that  any  extension  of  the  terms  of  a  license  shall  be  made  by  the 
Competent Body only on the basis of an authorizing decree of the President. 
Article 13 stipulates that an exploration license holder that makes a commercial 
discovery has an exclusive right to apply for and obtain a production license. (Here 
again, a presidential decree may now be required for this; not entirely clear in the 
PL as amended.)  
Licenses are now to be granted by the Competent Body – and, according to PL 
Article 16, only on the basis of a presidential decree (per PL Article 16) as noted 
above – and following a tender or direct negotiations carried out between the 
Competent Body and the license applicant. A tender may be either open to all 
applicants,  or  closed  (that  is,  open  only  to  a  limited  number  of  short-listed 
participants).  Despite  the  CIS-region  governments'  attraction  to  tenders  (or 
auctions)  as  the  economically  preferred  form,  in  Turkmenistan  the  large  new 
development projects still commonly proceed by direct negotiations. 
Investors  have  expressed  concern  in  Turkmenistan,  as  in  neighboring  countries 
with similar rules, over the government’s power unilaterally to annul a petroleum 
license  –  and  have  the  associated  contract  simply  be  terminated  and  deemed 
invalid – on various grounds outside of the parties’ contractual agreement. Article 
51 allows a contractor to assign all or part of its rights and obligations under the 
license  and  agreement  to  an  interested  third  party  only  with  the  prior  written 
consent of the Competent Body. A more permissive assignment rule applies to 
assignments  to  affiliates  and  shareholders,  where  consent  is  not  required. 
However, this more permissive treatment does require the assignor, for as long as 
it  retains  a  part  interest,  to  bear  joint  and  several  liability  together  with  the 
assignee. (The Petroleum Law defines an “affiliate” relationship as involving control 
of “more than 50%” of voting rights.) 
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1.3. Turkmenistan PSA and Other Arrangements 
The Turkmenistan Petroleum Law provides for certain types of contracts that may 
be used for conducting petroleum operations: (i) production sharing agreements 
(PSAs), (ii) joint activity agreements (JAAs), or (iii) as permitted by PL Article 24, a 
combination of these two types of agreement, as well as other kinds of agreements 
suited to the specific situation. The terms and conditions for conducting petroleum 
operations, including the program of work and expenses for such operations, are 
defined in these agreements. 
In accordance with Article 24 (as recently amended), PSAs are to be signed on the 
Turkmenistan  side  by  the  Competent  Body  –  again  on  the  basis  of  a  specific 
presidential decree. This change should add certainty in an area previously marked 
by some confusion. (The PL had earlier provided that the PSA could be signed by 
the Competent Body and/or a State Concern – and this was uncertainty over the 
possible role of the State Concerns, and who other than President Niyazov himself 
could legally sign on behalf of the Competent Body (although the PSAs to date 
seem to be signed by the President – acting in his capacity of Chairman of the 
Competent  Body  –  in  any  event).  The  agreements  concluded  between  the 
government  and  investors  to  date  for  fields  now  under  exploration  or 
development, as well as the pending E&P project negotiations, are all PSAs as far as 
we are aware. 
JAAs  are  to  be  signed  by  a  state  body  on  the  basis  of  a  presidential  decree 
(apparently,  not  by  the  Competent  Body,  although  it  would  appear  that  the 
President may also authorize the Competent Body to sign a JAA). In a JAA, the State 
is evidently always a party to the agreement through the state body authorized by 
the President. It is not clear to us whether any such JAA, as a type of petroleum 
development contract with the state (as distinct from a PSA), has been executed or 
is even in negotiations or discussion to date. 
Government-generated  “model”  contracts  on  production-sharing  (the  "Model 
PSA") and joint-venture activities (the “Model JAA”) in Turkmenistan have been in 
place  at  least  since  1997,  adopted  by  the  Decree  on  the  Competent  Body  and 
Model Contracts. (See footnote 5 above.) Note also that there have been at least 
three versions of the Model PSA made available from that time forward, as well as 
a  considerable  amount  of  de  facto  updating  of  the  model  from  negotiation  to 
negotiation – as each new potential PSA investor company has found. 
1.4. Uzbekistan Background 
Uzbekistan has a lot of oil and a lot of natural gas. The country is about the size of 
the state of California, and has a population of 24.8 million (U.S. Department of 
State, 2008). Uzbekistan is a landlocked country bordered by Kazakhstan to the 
north  and  west,  Kyrgyzistan  and  Tajikistan  to  the  east,  and  Afghanistan  and Michael P. BARRY  
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Turkmenistan to the south (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Uzbekistan has so 
far identified 187 hydrocarbon fields, including 91 gas and gas condensate fields 
and 96 oil and gas, oil condensate, and oil fields. The country is developing 88 of 
these fields; 58 fields are ready for development; nine are “held in reserve”, and 17 
are in “geological exploration” (Interfax, 2004). 
Uzbekistan has two older refineries at Fergana and Alty-Arik, and a newer one at 
Bukhara—all with a total refining capacity of 11.1  million tons per year (World 
Bank,  2003).  Uzbekistan’s  natural  gas  has  a  high  sulfur  content  which  requires 
significant processing. The majority of Uzbekistan’s gas is produced at the Mubarek 
processing plant, which has a capacity of approximately 28.3 million BCM per year 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). A relatively new Shurtan Gas-Chemical Complex 
was completed at the cost of about $1 billion, and the Kodzhaabad underground 
gas storage facility was completed in 1999 at the cost of $72 million (World Bank, 
2003). 
Uzbekneftegaz is the state-owned company that may sign oil and gas exploration 
and production contracts, independently perform petroleum operations in certain 
areas, act as a participant in joint ventures, and supervise petroleum operations 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Uzbekneftegaz is a holding company which is 
regulated under Presidential Decree No. UP-2154  (Republic  of  Uzbekistan,  1998a) and 
COM Resolution No. 523 (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1998c). Uzbekneftegaz controls 
downstream  and  related  activities  in  the  energy  sector,  including:  (1) 
Uzneftedobycha  (oil  extraction);  (2)  Uzneftegaz  Pererabotka  (oil  and  gas 
processing);  (3)  Uztransgaz  (gas  and  oil  transportation  and  pipelines);  and  (4) 
Uzvneshneftegaz  (foreign  economic  relations)  (Uzbekneftegaz  National  Holding, 
2009). 
In  addition  to  its  role  as  the  nominated  state  co-venturer  in  exploration  and 
production  ventures  with  foreign  investors,  Uzbekneftegaz  has  also  now  been 
designated as the “Competent Body” to regulate the oil and gas industry (Republic 
of Uzbekistan, 1994b). Such a dual role as both a producer and regulator might be 
considered  by  foreign  investors  as  a  conflict  of  interest.  Uzbekneftegaz,”  was 
founded  by  the  decree  of  the  President  of  Uzbekistan  on  December  11,  1998 
(Republic of Uzbekistan, 1998a; 1998b). The holding company was created out of 
nine companies in 1998 to unite the country's entire petroleum sector, and is now 
a mammouth state run concern (Anonimous, 2004). 
1.5. Uzbekistan Legal Framework 
Articles 3-4 and 7 of the Uzbekistan “Subsoil Law” grant authority over the subsoil 
(including  its  natural  resources)  to:  (1)  President;  (2)  Cabinet  of  Ministers  (the 
“COM”); (3) Local authorities; and (4) Specially designated state agencies (Republic 
of Uzbekistan, 1994b: Articles 3-4, 7). In addition to these powers, Article 4 of the 
Law On Natural Monopolies also gives the power of regulatory oversight for natural Foreign Direct Investments in Central Asian Energy: A CGE Model 
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monopolies to the state. These regulated activities include: (i) the extraction of oil, 
gas condensate, natural gas, and coal, and (ii) oil, petroleum products, and gas 
transportation by pipeline (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1997). 
As  is  common  in  former  Soviet  republics,  the  Uzbekistan  Constitution  vests 
ownership of the subsoil in the state (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994a). The Law on 
the  Subsoil  of  September  23,  1994  and  its  amendments  set  out  Uzbekistan's 
framework of statutes governing the exploration and development of all subsoil 
resources—including hydrocarbons and other minerals. The “Subsoil Law” covers 
state  licensing  and  control,  rights  and  obligations,  basic  rational  use  rules,  and 
other issues. It does not specify any particular form of contract favored or allowed 
for resource (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994a). There is also a new “Law on Licensing 
of  Certain  Activities”  of  May  25,  2000  (the  "Licensing  Law"),  (Republic  of 
Uzbekistan, 2000a) and the older, pre-existing Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 215 
On Licensing of Business Activities of April 14, 1994, as amended (the "Licensing 
Decree") (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994a) 
Approved licenses are the basis for oil and gas exploration and development in 
Uzbekistan. The Subsoil Law requires that a license be issued to any physical or 
legal persons, domestic or foreign. Specifically, under the Subsoil Law Articles 10 
through  14  and  the  Licensing  Decree,  a  license  is  required  only  for  mineral 
extraction  (Republic  of  Uzbekistan,  1994b,  Articles  10-14).  However,  it  is 
understood that licenses may be granted for exploration, production, or combined 
exploration and production (Hines and Sievers, 2001). 
Another important rule is Uzbekistan’s right to terminate a license. In Russia, where 
the state has authorized exploration under both a production sharing agreement 
regime  and  a  subsoil  licensing  regime,  the  Russian  state  reserves  the  right  to 
terminate, suspend, or limit an investor’s utilization of an approved license (The 
Russian Federation, 1992). 
In  Uzbekistan,  the  Subsoil  Law  (Art.  19)  provides  many  excuses  for  the  Uzbek 
authorities to terminate a license, including: (1) a finding of the user's violation of 
"the basic terms of the license"; (2) non-fulfillment of the Subsoil Law conditions 
for exploration, development, and workplace safety; (3) "necessity of confiscation 
of subsoil plots for other state or public needs"; (4) threat to human life or health 
or  to  the  environment;  (5)  failure  to  commence  work  within  a  year  of  initial 
licensing; and (6) "systematic" non-payment of resource use payments (which are 
established under Art. 22) (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994b: Article 19). 
If a dispute should arise regarding a license, Uzbek law provides that "in matters of 
use  and  protection  of  the  subsoil  shall  be  determined  in  court  in  the  manner 
established by law." (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994b: Article 19) This provision likely 
sounds a little vague to foreign investors, though other provisions of Uzbek law 
attempts  to  give  priority  to  international  law  and  treaties  in  the  choice  of Michael P. BARRY  
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jurisdiction for disputes. Several documents mention such priority, including: (1) 
Subsoil Law Article 5 (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1994b: Article 19); (2) provisions of 
the 1998 Investment Laws affording foreign investors the right to resolve disputes 
in international arbitration (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1998e: Article 19; 1998d); and 
(3)  Uzbekistan's  obligations  under  the  Energy  Charter  Treaty  (Republic  of 
Uzbekistan,  1994b:  Article  26).  Additionally,  the  Uzbek  “Law  on  Concessions” 
mentions the right to international arbitration (Republic of Uzbekistan, 1995).  
1.6. Uzbekistan PSA 
Beginning in 1998, the Government of Uzbekistan conducted a program to attract 
foreign investors to develop oil and gas deposits in the territory of Usturt plato in 
the Southwest of Uzbekistan, which, according to preliminary estimates, contains 4 
billion tons of oil (Saparov and Frolov, 2003).  
On  April  28,  2000,  the  Uzbekistan  Government  adopted  the  “Oil  And  Gas 
Investments Decree” as part of an organized plan to attract more FDI  into the 
Uzbek oil and gas sector. The Oil And Gas Investments Decree was introduced at a 
press conference on May 4, 2000, and was a main attraction at a major oil and gas 
convention held in Tashkent on May 17-18, 2000 (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2000b). The Oil 
and Gas Investments Decree contains several provisions of significant interest to 
foreign  investors.  First,  companies  which  conduct  exploratory  work  in  the 
Ustyurtskiy region (and possibly others) may be granted newly discovered oil and 
gas deposits for a period of up to 25 years with a “right to prolong the development 
period.” (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2000b)  
Oil and gas deposits may be granted to companies engaged in prospecting and 
exploration  work  “on  a  concession  basis.”  In  addition,  such  companies  are  to 
benefit from an investment regime which includes a number of right, including: (1) 
the exclusive right to prospect and explore various territories with a right to further 
develop any deposits found in these territories, either through a joint venture or 
through a concession; (2) a preemptive right to acquire new territory for further 
prospecting and exploration if no valuable industrial resources have been found 
there; (3) a right of ownership and a right to freely export extracted hydrocarbons 
and  their  products  processed  on  a  tolling  basis,  as  set  out  in  the  foundation 
documents of a joint venture or a concession agreement; and (4) a guarantee that 
actual expenses arising from prospecting and exploration will be reimbursed in the 
event that deposits “of industrial interest” are discovered and then transferred to 
Uzbekneftegaz for future development (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2000b). 
Foreign companies engaged in prospecting and exploring oil and gas deposits in 
Uzbekistan (along with their contractors and subcontractors) are exempted from 
“all types of taxes, deductions, and payments” in force in Uzbekistan during the 
period of prospecting and exploration, as well as customs duties (except for those 
for payment of customs formalization) when importing equipment, material, and Foreign Direct Investments in Central Asian Energy: A CGE Model 
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technical resources and  services needed to conduct prospecting, exploring, and 
related activities (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2000b). 
On May 25, 2000 the Oliy Majlis (Parliament) of the Republic of the Uzbekistan 
adopted the Law “On Licensing Of Specific Kinds Of Activity” (published on June 15, 
2000) (“Licensing Law”). The Licensing Law is effective from September 1, 2000 and 
provides the general legal framework for licensing (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2000a). 
With all the positive influences on the oil and gas sector provided by Decree UP-
2598, its effect on further development of contractual relationships in the sector 
was limited. This led to enactment of a full-fledged PSA Act at the end 2001. On 
December 7, 2001 Oliy Majlis (Parliament) of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted 
Resolution No. 312-II On Enactment of the Act “On Product Sharing Agreements” 
(“PSA Act”) (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2001). 
A key concept of a PSA (according to the PSA Act itself ) is that the Uzbek state 
grants to a foreign investor for a certain period of time exclusive rights to search 
for,  explore  deposits  and  extract  minerals  in  a  specified  segment  of  subsoil.  In 
return the investor is obliged to fulfill work plans determined by the agreement at 
its own risk and expense, as well as to transfer a share of the extracted product or 
its monetary equivalent to the State (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2001). 
The  Uzbek  government  has  been  hoping  to  attract  $400  million  of  foreign 
investment through production-sharing agreements (PSAs). Of the 80 fields offered 
under  PSA  arrangements,  78  fields  are  located  in  16  exploration  blocks.  Eight 
individual fields, with total reserves of some 1.2 billion barrels of oil equivalent, 
have been opened up for potential foreign participation. Those fields include four 
in the south-western Gissar Basin and four in the Amu Darya region (Anonimous, 
2004).  However,  success  under  PSA  laws  has  been  limited  because  foreign 
companies perceive the PSA terms as less attractive than those offered in other 
parts of Central Asia and Russia. Investors readily cite increased political risks in 
Uzbekistan due to Islamic opposition to President Karimov (Republic of Uzbekistan, 
2001). 
Such lack of success has serious implications for Uzbekistan. Uzbek government 
targets in their long-term resource development plans are rarely achieved. Under a 
program started in the 1990s, the Uzbek government predicted that Uzbekistan's 
oil production should reach 450,000 b/d by 2001. However, in 2001 the actual 
production of oil and condensate averaged only about 171,000 b/d (Republic of 
Uzbekistan, 2001).  
1.7. Privatization in Uzbekistan 
The Uzbek privatization program has run parallel to the development of the PSA 
regime.  On  March  9,  2001,  the  Uzbekistan  Government  announced  a  mass 
privatization  in  the  Resolution  of  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  the  Republic  of Michael P. BARRY  
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Uzbekistan “In Respect of Further Measures for Denationalization and Privatization 
of  Enterprises  with  Participation  of  Foreign  Investors  in  2001-2002”  (the  “2001 
Privatization Program”). The 2001 Privatization Program is intended to be carried 
out in part with the support of funds provided by a World Bank loan.
1 
There have been two previous mass privatization programs in Uzbekistan, the first 
announced in late 1998 and the second in late 1999. Neither were particularly 
successful, largely due to continued foreign currency exchange restrictions and the 
Uzbekistan Government’s reluctance to allow foreign investors to obtain control 
over the most attractive enterprises offered for privatization (Braude, 2003). Many 
of the enterprises listed in the 2001 Privatization Program have been previously 
subject to privatization, including the seven joint stock companies of Uzbekneftgaz 
and the Uzbekneftigaz Holding Company. With one exception, as previously, all of 
the Uzbekneftigaz companies are slated to remain majority controlled by the state.  
In the oil and gas sector, the Uzbek government has been offering a 49% stake in 
UzbekNefteGaz (UNG), but until recently, little progress seems to have been made 
(Anonimous,  2004).  To  improve  its  chances  of  a  sale,  the  government  is  again 
restructuring  UNG  to  make  it  more  profitable.  The  government  has  also  been 
offering to sell its 44% stake of Uzneftegazdobycha (UNG's oil and gas exploration 
arm),  44%  of  UzTransGaz  (in  charge  of  gas  transport  and  the  country's  gas 
pipelines), 39% of UzNeftePereRabotka (oil refining), and 39% of UzBurNefteGaz (a 
drilling company) (Anonimous, 2004). 
1.8. Kazakhstan Background 
Kazakhstan has the Caspian Sea region's largest recoverable crude oil reserves, and 
its production accounts for over half of the roughly 2.8 million barrels per day 
(bbl/d)  currently  being  produced  in  the  region  (including  regional  oil  producers 
Azerbaijan,  Uzbekistan,  and  Turkmenistan).  Kazakhstan  oil  exports  are  the 
foundation of the country’s economy and have ensured that average real According 
to the EIA, Kazakh GDP growth has stayed above 9 percent for the last 6 years. Real 
GDP growth during 2007 averaged 9.5 percent (Energy Information Agency, 2009). 
Kazakhstan's growing petroleum industry accounts for roughly 30 percent of the 
country’s  GDP  and  over  half  of  its  export  revenues.  In  an  effort  to  reduce 
Kazakhstan's exposure to price fluctuations for energy and commodities exports, 
the government created the National Oil Fund of Kazakhstan. Due to high oil prices 
the international reserves and assets in the oil fund have doubled in the last year to 
$20 billion in October 2007(Energy Information Agency, 2009). 
                                                           
1 On March 9, 2001, the Uzbekistan Government announced a mass privatization in the Resolution of 
the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  the  Republic  of  Uzbekistan  “In  Respect  of  Further  Measures  for 
Denationalization and Privatization of Enterprises with Participation of Foreign Investors in 2001-2002”. Foreign Direct Investments in Central Asian Energy: A CGE Model 
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As mentioned, Kazakhstan has a better record of attracting investments than do its 
other Central Asian neighbors. The U.S. Department of Energy believes this success 
is due to foreign investment into Kazakhstan, and offers an optimistic view of the 
future: 
Kazakhstan is important to world energy markets because it has significant oil and 
natural gas reserves. After years of foreign investment into the country's oil and 
natural gas sectors, the landlocked Central Asian state has recently begun to realize 
its enormous production potential. With sufficient export options, Kazakhstan could 
become a major world energy producer and exporter over the next decade (Energy 
Information Agency, 2009). 
Despite  the  successes,  Kazakhstan  still  faces  significant  energy  problems.  The 
government maintains a virtual monopoly over energy industries. And dspite its 
fossil fuel riches, Kazakhstan is a net importer of electricity, mainly from Russia. A 
major  cause  of  the  energy  imbalance  is  an  extremely  high  ratio  of  energy 
consumption to gross domestic product output. Reversal of energy dependency is a 
high priority of government economic policy (Library of Congress, 2007). 
As found in a study by the U.S. Library of Congress, Kazakhstan suffers from an 
inefficient domestic delivery system and the failure to utilize natural gas obtained 
in  oil  extraction  operations  (Library  of  Congress,  2007).  Perhaps  surprisingly, 
Kazakhstan  also  imports  natural  gas  from  Uzbekistan.  In  2004  infrastructure 
improved sufficiently for domestic output to equal consumption, at the level of 16 
billion cubic meters. In the first half of 2005, Kazakhstan became a net exporter of 
natural gas for the first time, as production continued to increase. According to an 
official forecast, in 2015 gas output will reach 50 billion cubic meters, compared 
with 20.5 billion cubic meters in 2004 (Library of Congress, 2007). In 2005, China 
and  Kazakhstan  had  talks  over  a  prospective  gas  pipeline  connection  from 
Kazakhstan to Shanghai on China’s east coast. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, foreign investment has stimulated rapid development 
of the oil industry. The state-owned oil and gas company, Kazmunaigaz, provides 20 
percent  of  output,  with  the  remainder  accounted  for  by  three  major  foreign 
consortia:  Tengizchevroil,  the  Karachaganak  Integrated  Operation,  and  the  Agip 
Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company. In the early 2000s, the government 
attempted to improve the terms of foreign ownership in the oil and gas industries, 
although substantial restrictions remain on ownership of Caspian operations. Plans 
call  for  development  of  an  ethanol  industry  to  supplement  conventional  fuels, 
using grain from the agricultural region of northern Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan would 
be a member of the Asian Energy Club, which Russia proposed in 2006 to unify oil, 
gas, and electricity producers, consumers, and transit countries in the Central Asian 
region in a bloc that is self-sufficient in energy. Other members would be China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Michael P. BARRY  
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1.9. Kazakhstan Legal Framework 
According to Andrew T. Griffin of the law firm DLA Piper, there are two main pieces 
of legislation regulating foreign investment into Kazakhstan’s energy sector. The 
first is the “Republic of Kazakhstan Law On Petroleum,” originally passed in June 
1995. The other is the “Law On the Subsurface and Use of the Subsurface," passed 
in January 1996 (Griffin, 2008). Both laws have been changed since their original 
introduction more than a decade ago. 
The Subsurface Law has the wider scope of the two pieces of legislation. It outlines 
the rules and regulations for an investor to acquire a “subsurface-use right.” In 
Kazakhstan the subsurface-use right is the equivalent to a license or a concession in 
other jurisdictions. In oil and gas projects, it is granted upon the execution of a 
"Hydrocarbon  Contract"  between  the  "Competent  Body",  i.e.,  the  Kazakhstan 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the producer, known in Kazakhstan 
typically as the "Contractor." (Griffin, 2008)  The Petroleum Law is in some ways an 
addendum to the Subsurface Law in that it regulates petroleum and gas projects. 
On important feature of Kazakhstan’s energy law is the government’s pre-emptive 
purchase  right  to  produced  hydrocarbons.  Previously,  the  Petroleum  Law 
previously required the Kazakh government to paw "world-market price" for any 
hydrocarbons that it received from producers. The 2007 Amendments now provide 
that  petroleum  acquired  by  the  government  under  pre-emptive  right  from  the 
Contractor be compensated "at prices not exceeding world-market prices." (Griffin, 
2008)
 This is significant because it means that the Kazakh Government now has the 
choice of negotiating down the price, instead of automatically paying the world 
market price. 
2. A CGE Model for Gas Investment 
2.1. Background of General Equilibrium Models 
Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  modeling  specifies  all  economic 
relationships in mathematical terms and puts them together in a form that allows 
the model to predict the change in variables such as prices, output and economic 
welfare  resulting  from  a  change  in  economic  policies.  To  do  this,  the  model 
requires information about technology (the inputs required to produce a unit of 
output),  policies  and  consumer  preferences.  The  key  of  the  model  is  “market 
clearing,” the condition that says supply should equal demand in every market. The 
solution, or “equilibrium,” is that set of prices  where  supply equals demand in 
every market— goods, factors, foreign exchange, and everything else (Hertel et.al., 
2007).   
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2.2. The Global Trade Analysis Project 
GTAP is a multi-regional CGE model which captures world economic activity in 57 
different industries of 113 regions (Version 7). The underlying equation system of 
GTAP includes two different kinds of equations. One part covers the accounting 
relationships which ensure that receipts and expenditures of every agent in the 
economy  are  balanced.  The  other  part  of  the  equation  system  consists  of 
behavioral equations which based upon microeconomic theory. These equations 
specify  the  behavior  of  optimizing  agents  in  the  economy,  such  as  demand 
functions (Hertel et.al., 2007). Input-out tables summarize the linkages between all 
industries and agents. 
The mathematical relationships assumed in the GTAP model are simplified, though 
they  adhere  to  the  principle  of  “many  markets.”  The  simplification  is  that 
thousands of markets are “aggregated” into groups. For example, ‘transport and 
communications  services’  appear  as  a  single  industry.  In  principle  all  the 
relationships in a model could be estimated from detailed data on the economy 
over  many  years.  In  practice,  however,  their  number  and  parameterization 
generally outweigh the data available. In the GTAP model, only the most important 
relationships have been econometrically estimated. These include the international 
trade elasticities and the agricultural factor supply and demand elasticities.  
2.3. Structure of this Paper’s Model 
In this paper, I have updated my modeling to use GTAP Version 7 data. While the 
core database has 57 sectors and 113 regions, I have again aggregated the matrices 
to  simplify  the  world  into  just  10  sectors,  eight  regions,  and  five  factors  of 
production. This aggregation is described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Aggregation Used in the Model 
Regions  Sectors  Factors 
United States  Cotton  Land 
European Union  Oilseeds  Unskilled Labor 
Russia  Textiles and Apparel  Skilled Labor 
Central Asia  Oil  Capital 
China  Gas  Natural Resources 
India  Metals and Minerals   
Japan  Food   
Rest of World  Manufacturing   
  Services   
  Capital Goods   
The  data  is  first,  “calibrated,”  meaning  the  model  is  solved  for  its  original 
equilibrium prices and volumes in all markets. This baseline is meant to represent 
the  economy  as  is,  before  any  shock  takes  place.  Thousands  of  equations  are 
created, each representing supply and demand conditions in markets inside each Michael P. BARRY  
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region,  including  markets  for  goods,  services,  factors  of  production,  savings, 
government expenditure, and more.  
The “shock” in this model is the introduction of foreign investment into the natural 
gas  sector  of  Central  Asia.  For  experiment  purposes,  a  10  percent  productivity 
increase  is  introduced  to  the  gas  sector  in  Central  Asia.  Foreign  investment  is 
assumed  to  bring  increased  capital,  infrastructure,  management  skills,  and 
technology  to  the  Central  Asian  fields.  This  would  result  in  an  increase  in 
productivity and output of the natural gas sector in these regions. The magnitude 
of the shock is not as important as the relative changes it brings to the various 
economies involved. A different line of research would be needed to measure the 
correlation  between  FDI  and  productivity.  For  GTAP  model  purposes,  this  is  a 
convenient way to bring FDI into the model. The goal of the model is to measure 
what effects such a productivity change would have on the region and the world. 
2.4. Model Results 
The foreign investment into Uzbekistan’s natural gas sector results in changes to 
trade balances. Overall Central Asia experiences a decrease in its trade balance, 
despite a now stronger gas sector. As shown in Table 2, Central Asia’s trade balance 
decreases  by  $41.9  million  dollars.  Interestingly,  Russia,  a  major  partner  in 
Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector, experiences a $132.8 million decrease in its trade 
balances. All other regions of the world see an improvement in trade balances. 
While these effects are not very large in relation to the size of these economies, the 
significance of the changes in trade is better seen by examining trade in individual 
sectors. 
Table 2. Change in Trade Balances (Millions of dollars) 
  Change 
US  71.28 
EU  39.87 
Russia  -132.8 
Central Asia  -34.9 
China  16.78 
India  6.42 
Japan  36.65 
ROW  -4.56 
Source: Generated by author 
Changes in trade balances by sector provide evidence of possible Dutch Disease in 
Central Asia. Increased Central Asian exports of natural gas and oil appear to come 
at the expense of decreased exports in every other sector. As presented in Table 3, 
Central Asia’s natural gas exports increase by a half billion dollars ($502 million). 
Meanwhile, manufacturing net exports fall $237.44 billion, metals and minerals net 
exports fall by $131.55 million, and food net exports fall by $78 million. Foreign Direct Investments in Central Asian Energy: A CGE Model 
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Outside of Central Asia, the trade effects are also significant. While Central Asia’s 
trade balance in natural gas expands, trade balances in natural gas decline in Russia 
and the rest of the world. It would appear the increased Central Asian productivity 
in gas comes at the expense of gas sales from Russia and the Middle East. 
Table 3. Change in Trade Balances by sector (Millions of dollars) 
DTBALi  US  EU  Russia 
Central 
Asia  China  India  Japan  ROW 
Cotton  1.44  0.54  -0.48  -4.65  0.16  0.09  -0.04  4.3 
OilSeeds  0.71  -0.03  -0.02  -2.15  0.22  0.11  -0.04  1.31 
TextilesApp  0.89  6.55  3.62  -35.3  7.55  2.3  0.91  15.41 
Oil  -3.95  -3.33  -12.47  1.99  0.45  -0.41  -1.88  17.43 
Gas  46.43  63.76  -271.19  502.32  -1.33  -0.11  45.71  -359.85 
MetalsMin  3.12  25.22  47.55  -131.55  7.43  1.63  7.51  38.44 
Food  2.45  5.76  16.76  -51.89  1.96  1.35  1.49  21.45 
Mnfcs  26.78  -51.77  61.65  -237.44  -7.88  -0.36  -21.93  226.56 
Svces  -0.25  -16.67  32.6  -77.89  6.21  1.89  6.88  47.51 
Source: Generated by author 
Exports and imports can be individually examined. In Central Asia, the productivity 
shock results in a 17.6 percent increase in gas exports, accompanied by significant 
decreases in exports of textiles and apparel (-1.18 percent), manufactures (-1.19 
percent), metals and minerals (-1.09 percent), and cotton (-0.66 percent). Changes 
in aggregate exports are presented in Table 4. 
Global import patterns are also affected. In Central Asia, while imports of natural 
gas decrease, imports increase in every other sector, including food (0.52 percent), 
textiles  and  apparel  (0.6  percent),  oil  seeds  (0.6  percent),  manufactures  (0.5 
percent), metals and minerals (0.4 percent), and services (0.5 percent). (See Table 
5). Natural gas imports increase significantly in Russia (12.7 percent), India (11.7 
percent), and China (2.6 percent).  
 
Table 4. Change in Aggregate Exports by Sector (Percent) 
Qxw  US  EU  Russia 
Central 
Asia  China  India  Japan  ROW 
Cotton  0.07  0.13  -0.24  -0.66  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.09 
OilSeeds  0.01  0.02  -0.06  -1.11  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.01 
TextilesApp  0.00  0.01  0.04  -1.18  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01 
Oil  0.03  0.01  -0.08  -0.05  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.01 
Gas  -1.74  -0.67  -1.01  17.60  -4.98  -23.73  -5.68  -0.70 
MetalsMin  0.01  0.02  0.24  -1.09  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02 
Food  0.00  0.01  0.12  -0.81  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Mnfcs  0.00  0.00  0.17  -1.19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
Svces  0.00  0.00  0.19  -0.48  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Source: Generated by author Michael P. BARRY  
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Table 5. Change in Aggregate Imports by Sector (Percent) 
Qiw 
  US  EU  Russia 
Central 
Asia  China  India  Japan  ROW 
Cotton  0.00  0.00  -0.07  0.19  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.02 
OilSeeds  -0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.58  0.00  -0.06  0.00  -0.01 
TextilesApp  0.00  0.00  -0.08  0.59  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oil  0.00  0.00  0.10  -0.16  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Gas  0.08  0.07  10.00  -0.57  2.28  9.71  0.02  0.11 
MetalsMin  0.00  0.00  -0.17  0.43  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Food  0.00  0.00  -0.11  0.60  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mnfcs  0.00  0.00  -0.07  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Svces  0.00  0.00  -0.10  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
Source: Generated by author 
Changes  in  output  reflect  the  same  patterns.  In  Central  Asia,  total  domestic 
production increases in natural gas, but decreases in almost every other sector of 
the  economy.  Central  Asian  natural  gas  production  increases  by  16.48  percent, 
while  output  falls  in  cotton  (-0.2  percent),  textiles  and  apparel  (-0.3  percent), 
metals and minerals (-0.3 percent), and manufactures (-0.2 percent). Across the 
globe, natural gas output declines in Russia (-0.40 percent), the United States (-0.3 
percent), the EU (-0.3 percent), and the rest of the world (-0.3 percent). The results 
are presented in Table 6.   
Table 6. Change in Output Volume by Sector (Percent) 
Qo  US  EU  Russia 
Central  
Asia  China  India  Japan  ROW 
Cotton  0.02  0.11  -0.04  -0.21  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.03 
OilSeeds  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
TextilesApp  0.00  0.01  0.03  -0.27  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Oil  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Gas  -0.28  -0.31  -0.35  14.33  -0.20  0.00  -0.26  -0.31 
MetalsMin  0.00  0.01  0.20  -0.33  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Food  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mnfcs  0.00  0.00  0.09  -0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Svces  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CGDS  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.43  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Source: Generated by author 
Changes in output and trade reflect changes in market prices. In Central Asia, the 
productivity shock in gas creates a premium on owning gas reserves. While the 
extra supply of Central Asian gas pushes the market price for gas down by 1.5 
percent, the demand for Central Asian natural resources (including gas reserves) 
increases by a dramatic 13.3 percent. (See Table 7). The market prices of all other 
factors and output increase marginally. Globally, the expanded supply of natural 
gas pushes its market price down in all regions.  
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Table 7. Change in Market Price by Sector (Percent) 
Pm  US  EU  Russia 
Central 
Asia  China  India  Japan  ROW 
Land  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
UnSkLab  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
SkLab  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Capital  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
NatRes  -0.15  -0.24  -1.09  13.30  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.31 
Cotton  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
OilSeeds  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
TextilesApp  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Oil  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Gas  -0.58  -0.60  -0.71  -1.48  -0.44  -0.01  -0.52  -0.61 
MetalsMin  0.00  0.00  -0.03  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Food  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mnfcs  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
Svces  0.00  0.00  -0.05  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CGDS  0.00  0.00  -0.04  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Source: Generated by author 
Finally, a basic question for any shock to the economy is the overall welfare effect 
on the citizens of that region (Table 8). The global economy experiences a net gain 
in welfare of $350.5 million dollars. The biggest winners in the global economy 
include Central Asia ($445 million), the European Union ($134.7 million), and the 
United States ($61.7 million). The biggest losers include Russia (-$135.6 million) and 
the Rest of the World (-$189.7 million). Central Asia gains from the technology-
driven increase in productivity and a significant improvement in its terms of trade. 
The terms of trade gain comes at the expense of Russia and the rest of the world, 
two regions which themselves pay for the right to explore gas in Central Asia. 
In conclusion, the results suggest that Central Asia would be better off overall from 
foreign investment in its natural gas sector, due mostly to improvements in overall 
production  efficiency  and  its  overall  terms  of  trade.  However,  the  gain  in  the 
natural gas sector would come at the expense of production and net exports of 
non-petroleum  related  industries—manufacturing,  agriculture,  minerals  and 
metals, textiles and apparel, and other sectors.  
Table 8. Welfare Decomposition (Millions of Dollars) 
WELFARE 
Allocation 
Efficiency 
Technology 
Gain 
Terms of 
Trade 
Savings and 
Investment Efficiency  Total 
1 US  -0.6  0  46  16.3  61.7 
2 EU  24.5  0  115.3  -5  134.7 
3 Russia  -8.4  0  -137.6  10.4  -135.6 
4 Central Asia  19.3  322.4  104.8  -1.5  445 
5 China  0.7  0  1.7  -5.8  -3.4 
6 India  -0.6  0  -1.4  -0.3  -2.3 
7 Japan  -0.3  0  45.3  -5  40 
8 ROW  -6.5  0  -174.1  -9  -189.7 
Total  28.1  322.4  0  0  350.5 
Source: Generated by author Michael P. BARRY  
 
 
Page | 52                                                                               EJBE 2009, 2(3) 
2.5. Policy Implications 
The results of this limited experiment suggest Central Asia should consider taking a 
balanced  approach  to  development.  While  increased  oil  and  gas  output  would 
definitely increase the welfare of its citizens, the picture is not completely rosy. A 
unilateral  focus  on  laws  and  policies  designed  to  boost  foreign  investment  in 
natural  gas  would  come  at  a  significant  cost  of  decreased  production  and  net 
exports of the region’s other industries. 
For  example,  Central  Asia  earns  a  significant  share  of  its  export  earning  in  the 
cotton sector. Foreign investment in oil and gas is desirable, but given the results of 
this model, Uzbek lawmakers should also support growth in its existing sectors. This 
story is magnified in manufacturing, food, and textiles and apparel. Increased gas 
output appears to hit these sectors even more negatively than the cotton sector. 
In conclusion, these Central Asian republics should continue its pursuit of foreign 
investment  in  oil  and  gas.  But  they  should  also  use  its  laws,  policies,  and 
development strategies to support its other industries. 
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